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Introduction
In this paper, I examine the implications of increasing globalisation of share ownership on the economics of protection. In particular, I examine the argument traditionally made for such protection on the basis of a pro…t-shifting motive. If proper account is taken of the foreign ownership share of national Thanks to Daniel Gros, Rafael Plata, Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, Ben Ferrett and Vasileios Zikos for advice and suggestions, as well as to an anonymous referee. Any errors are my own.
1 champions, the pro…t-shifting arguments in favour of protecting such …rms are greatly reduced. Current data on European stock exchanges indicate that over 30 per cent of the stock market is foreign-owned in the majority of countries, a large increase on a couple of decades ago.
The issue which I address is whether this degree of foreign share-ownership is likely to change qualitatively the nature of the response of governments to FDI and support for 'domestic' …rms. In particular, I use a series of worked examples, based upon duopoly theory using both linear and isoelastic demand speci…cations. In most cases, the level of foreign share-ownership is now su¢ cient to render protection unattractive.
Pro…t shifting and protection
Much of the literature on strategic trade policy is reviewed in BRANDER [1995] . Models such as the BRANDER AND SPENCER [1985] or EATON AND GROSSMAN [1986] assume that one …rm in a duopoly is domesticallyowned, while the other is foreign owned. The government therefore has an incentive to intervene, via subsidies or other policies, to favour its own national company. The key motive is pro…t-shifting: if a market is imperfectly competitive, then …rms will charge a pro…t markup over marginal cost, where is typically expected to be 1=(("= ) 1), where " is the demand elasticity and is its market share. Therefore, if marginal costs are constant, pro…ts will account for proportion =(1 + ) of total turnover. A policy such as a tari¤ or quota or subsidy, or the use of regulations to keep a foreign entrant out, would be expected to worsen consumer welfare: however, if the share of pro…ts in output, =(1 + ); is su¢ ciently large, and if the policy raises the domestic …rms'share of those pro…ts by a su¢ cient amount, then the policy may bene…t national welfare at the margin (at the expense of foreigners). Pro…t-shifting is frequently cited as a motivation for the government intervention in a number of industries, such as civil aircraft manufacturing (PAVCNIK [2002] )..
The impact of foreign share ownership on these pro…t-shifting duopoly models 1 was examined in a series of papers around 1990. LEE [1990] examines in theoretical terms a Cournot setup in a two-country world, where only one country (1) consumes the good in question. A home …rm based in country 1 competes with imports from a rival in country 2. An increase in the proportion of the …rm in country 2 owned by inhabitants of 1 and vice-versa is shown to lower the optimal export subsidy and import tari¤ at the same rate. He then derives the critical values of home share-ownership and ownership abroad where export subsidies and/or import taxes become negative. These values are fairly speci…c to the case where there are just two countries in the World: in practice, many shares may be owned by third-party nationals.
DICK [1993] examines a model, following BRANDER AND SPENCER [1985] , where two …rms of di¤erent nationality compete in a third country's market. Again this is examined in the context of Cournot competition with a linear demand function. On data for the United States from the US Department of Commerce [1990] , where an average of 14% of US industry was owned by foreigners 2 , while 3.36% of non-US industry was owned by Americans, he estimated that the average optimal export subsidy would be reduced by 47% relative to the Brander-Spencer value.
In this paper, I suggest that even Dick's [1993] paper underestimates the di¤erence international share ownership would make in many countries today. This is both because many countries have far more internationalised equity markets than the United States, and also because the degree of international share-ownership has grown hugely over the last 15 years. In the classic linear Cournot setup of two …rms competing for a third-country market, international share-ownership in most cases now exceeds the critical levels where any (nonnegative) level of export subsidy is optimal. I then extend this analysis to the isoelastic demand version of the model, where threshold values have not previously been derived, and look in more detail at scenarios of protection in an importing country. In particular, I go beyond tari¤-setting (which is often ruled out in practice by international agreements), and look at regulatory protection and the exclusion of foreign competitors to national champions. In all these scenarios, I …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of international share-ownership: in most cases, pro…t-shifting is unlikely to be su¢ cient to justify protectionism.
It should be noted that there are other possible reasons for protecting a domestic …rm, apart from pro…t-shifting. These include exploitation of static and dynamic scale economies or spillovers, distributional factors, the desirability of maintaining domestic head-o¢ ce capability, the supposed greater accountability of local …rms to local regulators etc. Nevertheless, I largely concentrate in this paper on cases where pro…t shifting is the primary motive for protection.
Internationalisation of Share Ownership
A key feature of the early papers on pro…t-shifting (i.e. prior to LEE [1990] ) is that …rms can easily be classi…ed according to their 'nationality': in other words, they assume 100% of shares in the domestic …rm(s) are owned by domestic nationals, and 100% of shares in foreign …rms are owned by foreigners. While this may be the case when a …rm is nationalised, or where it is a private or family-owned company, it is unlikely to be the case with most public limited companies (see recent papers by EDWARDS AND GROS [2006] and VERON [2006] on the demise of European national champions).. We can split shares into those owned directly by the state (proportion s), those directly owned by foreigners, proportion ; those owned by other …rms and …nancial institutions based in the domestic country quoted on the stock market, proportion m and those directly owned by pension funds and the like, proportion p = 1 s m: If the rate of corporate taxation is t, then a lower bound estimate for the share of pro…ts of domestically-based companies (net of tax) which actually ends up accruing to foreigners is
However, if many of the other …rms and …nancial institutions who own shares within the country are themselves partly foreign-owned, then a higher estimate of the proportion of pro…ts which actually ends up in companies'hands is the solution to a geometric progression, which yields:
Taking the examples of Germany, France, the UK and Italy in 2003 the structure of share ownership, as quoted by FESE, is shown in Appendix Table 2 shows. In this table, in most countries at least 1=3 of shares are now foreign-owned, and the true …gure may well be over 50% in most cases. Data are missing for many European countries prior to 1995, and foreign shareowning ‡uctuates over time. However, Figure 1 , below, shows that in a number of countries for which long time-series are available, the upward trend, decade-on-decade, is remarkable. For example, direct foreign share ownership in the UK rose from around 8% in 1985 to a third today. Figure 1 Comparable data on foreign equity ownership in the United States are relatively hard to come by. BERTAUT et al [2006] estimate foreigners owned 10 per cent of U.S. equity in June 2005 -an increase from 5 per cent in 1994 -though their paper outlines a number of data issues. This number almost certainly excludes cases of wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries, which is why it does not tally easily with the FDI-based estimates used by DICK [1993] .
Since is the share of post-tax pro…ts which accrue to foreigners, we also need to correct for corporate taxation. From DEVEREUX AND GRIF-FITH's database 3 I use estimates of the e¤ective average tax rate in 2005, adjusted for time-and country-speci…c in ‡ation. These tax rates range from just under 20% to just over 30% in the selected sample of countries. When adjustment is made for this, then, for those countries on which tax and stock market ownership data are available, the lower estimate of the share of pro…ts accruing to foreigners ranges from 10.8% in Italy to 52.4% in the Netherlands, while the higher estimate ranges from 21% in Italy to 63.7% in the Netherlands.
4 Implications of foreign share ownership for protectionist policies: export subsidies with a duopoly
The …rst example I choose to look at is the classic case of duopolists from two countries selling into a third country market. This is an issue given some prominence by the classic paper of BRANDER and SPENCER (1985) , and, while the analysis is simpli…ed, is widely regarded as having some relevance to real policy issues -notably the Boeing/Airbus dispute. This essentially looks at a two-stage game between the two …rms and the two governments of their 'home'countries. Following a standard model formulation, I assume that the …rms have identical costs and make indistinguishable products, and compete for the third country market in a subgame on the basis of Cournot conjectures about each other's output. The two exporting country governments, however, both have a potential motive to intervene in the export market, each subsidising 'its' …rm's exports, with the intention of gaining a larger share of the market and hence a greater share of combined pro…ts, which are supranormal because of the duopoly. In this higher-level game, each of the two governments is assumed to form a …xed conjecture of the other's likely subsidy level. I assume initially that each country is small relative to the global …nan-cial economy, even though they are large relative to this particular industry. Consequently, while proportion of country 1's industry is owned by foreign-ers,country 1's ownership of shares in any one foreign country, 2, is assumed to be negligible. The e¤ects of relaxing this assumption are discussed later in the paper. I also concentrate on the case where there are constant returns to scale. 4 This problem has been solved in the linear demand case 5 by DICK [1993] and NEARY [1994] , 6 with the result that, regardless of scale or cost asymmetries, the Brander-Spencer argument for subsidy always breaks down when the share of foreign ownership, = 1=4: Nevertheless, for comparison with the isoelastic demand case below, I lay out the main properties of the linear model (in the symmetric case) below, where the …rms are denoted 1 and 2, and we are interested in the welfare e¤ects of a subsidy S in country 1.
Linear Cournot Duopoly Inverse demand
C S for …rm 1 and C for …rm 2: Table 1 : Summary of a linear, cross-hauling, Cournot duopoly selling into a third country market.
The threshold value of foreign ownership, = e , at which @W 1 =@S = 0 when S = 0, is satis…ed by = 1=4, as in the earlier papers.
As an alternative, however, it is worth comparing the result for an isoelastic demand model. This derives from a utility function
where D = D 1 + D 2 : I concentrate on the elastic demand case, where 0 < < 1: 7 This generates an own-price elasticity of " = 1= ( 1) for the combined output. In a symmetric equilibrium, subsidies in the two countries are equal, so S 1 = S 2 = S . This can be summarised as follows, setting cost equal to 1 S i (without loss of generality):
Cournot duopoly/isoelastic Two …rms exporting to a third country Inverse demand Table 2 : Summary of an isoelastic, cross-hauling, Cournot duopoly selling into a third country market.
The solution is the value of = e for which @W 1 =@S 1 = 0 when S = 0. By substitution, it can be shown that this is satis…ed by = 1=3:
Proposition 1 In a scenario of two identical producers from di¤erent nations acting as a Cournot duopoly in a third country, where marginal costs are constant and the demand elasticity is constant, the Nash equilibrium subsidy level for the two governments will equal zero when foreign ownership of shares is 1/3 of the total. This compares to a threshold value of foreign ownership of 1/4 in a Cournot duopoly when demand is linear.
Proof of Proposition 1
The linear case has been proven before in DICK [1993] and NEARY [1994] , and can be generalised to asymmetric cost functions. As a check, the condition is that @W 1 =@S = 0 when S = 0: this is found by setting (4) @W 1 =@S = 4(1 )(A C + 2S)=9b (A C + 2S)=3b + 2S=3b = 0:
For the isoelastic demand case, we want to solve the set of equations above to …nd the value of = , which gives S = 0. Consequently, we substitute for S = 0 in @W 1 =@S 1 .
Substituting into this equation for P ; D 1 ; @D 1 =@S 1 and @P=@S==> 1 + = 3(1 + ) ;
It is worth noting that both critical values are probably now below the average level of foreign share ownership reported on most European stock markets at present.
Entry of a Foreign Competitor to a Domestic Monopolist
I now widen the discussion to models of entry or exit of a foreign …rm to compete with a domestic monopolist. This can take a number of forms depending on the nature of the industry: in some cases, the good is internationally tradable, in which case the question is the setting of tari¤s and/or non-tari¤ barriers to exclude the foreign …rm. In the case of tari¤s, the setup is essentially an extension of BRANDER AND SPENCER [1985] , allowing for entry of the foreign …rm. Alternatively, the good or service concerned may not be easily tradable, but the government of the host country may be contemplating whether or not to allow entry of a foreign …rm to challenge a national champion. This example could be seen as a case of 'economic patriotism': 8 a loosely-de…ned term, which appears to be mostly concerned with preventing foreign entry into 'strategic'industries and takeover of 'national champion'companies. In some service industries, such as privatised utilities, the only way to enter is by FDI.
The linear Cournot duopoly
I will start by examining the pro…t-shifting motive for protection in the case of a linear, Cournot duopoly. We should note in passing that, in the case of protecting a local champion against a potential importer, a country's preferred method of protection, ceteris paribus, would be tari¤s, which raise revenue. However, due to issues of the visibility of tari¤s, advanced countries generally resort to regulatory protection instead. I summarise both cases here. The model, which is summarised in EDWARDS [2007] , assumes that the two …rms have unit costs C 1 and C 2 , but that …rm 2, which is foreign, faces an additional iceberg cost per unit, ; to overcome regulatory barriers to entering the market. These regulations are assumed to be of the pure, horizontal variety (i.e. they do not add to welfare in the importing country). The model can be summarised as follows: Linear Cournot duopoly with regulatory barrier and tari¤ t Inverse demand Table 3 : Summary of a linear, Cournot duopoly with a foreign and domestic …rm. [2007] discusses the interaction of tari¤s and non-tari¤ barriers in this model. If the home country is free to set tari¤s, then it will never use non-tari¤ barriers (quotas or horizontal regulatory barriers) to exclude the foreign …rm, since the latter yield no revenue. Consequently, we can assume = 0: It follows that
Setting of tari¤s

EDWARDS
Setting this equal to zero gives us a relationship between and the welfare-maximising tari¤, t .
Note …rst that, where C 1 = C 2 = C, we can derive (7) t = (3 2 )(A C)=(2 + 9):
From this follows
Lemma 2 When there is no foreign ownership, the welfare-maximising tari¤ for country 1 is (A C)=3:
Lemma 3 When there is total foreign ownership, the welfare-maximising tari¤ for country 1 is (A C)=11:
Both lemmas follow from substituting = 0 or = 1 in equation (6).
Lemma 4 The welfare-maximising tari¤ declines monotonically as foreign ownership increases.
This follows from di¤erentiating (7) with respect to and rearranging:
Since 0 6 6 1; this will be negative.
From these lemmas follows
Proposition 5 In a symmetric, linear Cournot model, where the two …rms have identical costs (before including the tari¤ ) the welfare-maximising tari¤, t ; will always be positive, even if foreign ownership is 100 %.
From inspection of (6), we can see that the welfare-maximising tari¤ will be lower if the foreign …rm is the lower-cost producer. For a given value of C 1 , @t =@C 2 < 0: Alternatively, setting t = 0; (6) can be rewritten as (9) = (3 2 )=2 :
From this we can derive that, when foreign ownership is 100%, t falls to zero when = 1=2; but that, even when foreign ownership is 75%, C 2 must already be higher than the demand intercept A. An intuitive explanation why tari¤-setting is less a¤ected by the foreign ownership of local …rms than in the other scenarios examined in this paper is that tari¤s are justi…ed, at least partly, by extraction of producer rent from foreign …rms in the form of tari¤ revenue, rather than simply by pro…t-shifting.
Regulatory protection
Tari¤s are often ruled out by international agreements, or are seen as too visible. Consequently, it is widely argued 9 that countries will resort to regulatory protection to keep foreign …rms out. EDWARDS [2007] looks at the use of pure, horizontal regulatory protection in a linear model, and shows that it is quite di¤erent in its implications to the situation where the home country is free to apply tari¤s.
Throughout this subsection, I consider the properties of the linear Cournot duopoly model, when t is constrained to equal zero. First, consider the situation when = 0:
Lemma 6 When there is no foreign-ownership of …rm 1, then welfare in country 1 is initially increasing with respect to the regulatory barrier, ; unless C 2 is less than C 1 . This lemma is proven by setting = 0; so that @W 1 =@ = (C 2 C 1 + )=3b: Also Lemma 7 When there is no foreign ownership, the marginal gain to country 1 from increasing the regulatory barrier, ; is monotonically increasing with respect to :
This follows from setting = 0, and di¤erentiating @W 1 =@ again with respect to :
From these two lemmas follows the proposition:
Proposition 8 In a linear Cournot duopoly, in the absence of foreign ownership, and when tari¤s are ruled out, country 1 will prefer to raise the regulatory barrier to the point where the foreign …rm is totally excluded, unless C 1 is su¢ ciently larger than C 2 .
The logic behind this proposition is that Lemma 4 shows that, starting from zero protection, the initial marginal welfare e¤ect of raising is positive, while Lemma 5 shows that subsequent increases in produce still larger welfare gains, until the foreign …rm is driven out completely. 13 EDWARDS [2007] shows that 'su¢ ciently larger'in this case means (10) jC 1 C 2 j < jA C 1 j =2:
We now want to ask whether, and how, this total exclusion result is changed when there is some foreign ownership of …rm 1. Doubly di¤erenti-ating W 1 with respect to ; we …nd that
For a given value of between 0 and 1, @ 2 W 1 =@ 2 is constant and positive. There will only be one turning-point for W 1 with respect to ; and this will be a minimum. Looking at the range of from 0 up to the point where the foreign …rm is excluded, the optimal value of will not be an interior point (since there is only one turning-point, which is a minimum, not a maximum). There follows Lemma 9 When foreign ownership is introduced in the linear Cournot model, and protection takes the form of horizontal regulatory protection, the importing country government's preferred solution will be either no protection or total exclusion of the foreign …rm.
To see which solution will be preferred, it is also necessary to compare the solution with that of a monopoly, where the foreign …rm has been totally excluded from the market.
Monopoly Duopoly Inverse demand P = A bD 1 : From the above, we can deduce that,
Proposition 10
In a linear Cournot model, when costs are symmetric between the two …rms, the importing country's government will prefer to exclude the foreign …rm if and only if foreign ownership of its domestic …rm is less than thirty per cent.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note that
where the asterisk indicates the situation where costs of the two …rms are equal. The value of = b ; which equates W 1M with W 1D , is found by rearranging these equations:
Q.E.D. The 30% threshold in Proposition 4 is interesting as, once again, it lies below the current levels of foreign ownership in many countries, whereas a decade ago this was not the case.
It is also interesting to see how this is altered in the case of di¤erential costs for the two …rms. Given the relative complexity of the equations, a numerical solution method is applied, as shown in Table 5 , below. Table 5 : Critical foreign ownership share for excluding a foreign competitor to a domestic monopolist: linear demand.
In the calculations, I have set C 1 = 1, without loss of generality. The …gure shows that, whenever production costs are equal (C 2 = C 1 = 1), the critical value of is 0:3, as in Proposition 4. However, when the foreign …rm's costs are lower than the domestic …rm, the critical threshold value of is lower, so that only with very low levels of foreign ownership will the home country choose to exclude the foreign …rm. This is particularly true when the demand intercept, A, is relatively low. By contrast, if the foreign …rm has much higher costs than the domestic …rm, the home country may prefer to exclude it even when a higher proportion of its domestic …rm is foreign-owned.
A Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand
Again, I will concentrate on the case where a foreign …rm seeks -maybe as part of a general industry deregulation -to move in to challenge a local monopolist. Given that this is a complicated model to solve, I will concentrate on the case where costs of the two …rms are symmetric (normalised at $1 per unit) and where the government's choice is simply one of excluding the foreign …rm totally or allowing it to enter.
10
The choice facing the government of the host country is therefore whether to persist with a protected monopoly (I assume there is no price regulation) or to allow the foreign …rm to enter and create a duopoly. In the latter situation, prices will be lower and output higher, so bene…ting consumers. Half of the duopoly pro…ts, however, will be sent abroad. The foreign …rm is entirely foreign-owned, whereas share (1 ) of the domestic …rm is owned by domestic residents. I will ignore pro…t taxes in this simple analysis, though they serve, in practice, to reduce :
Consumers have a utility function as in (3) above. The outcomes under a monopoly and a symmetric Cournot duopoly are: Table 6 : Summary of an isoelastic monopoly versus a Cournot duopoly with a foreign entrant.
Solution and comparison
Rather than solving these two models algebraically, it is more sensible in this case to carry out a numerical simulation for each model, based upon alternative values of " and . The scale parameter, ; can be shown to have no e¤ect on whether the country will prefer a protected monopoly or a duopoly.
In general, the more elastic demand is (the higher " or the lower is), the more likely, other things equal, a country will prefer 'economic patriotism'. This is because the costs of monopoly, in terms of loss of consumer surplus, are less when demand is elastic. There is therefore a critical threshold elasticity, " , above which the country will prefer a domestic monopoly to a half-foreign duopoly. Simulations show that, when there is no foreign share-ownership in the domestic …rm (i.e. = 0), the critical value " lies at around 2:7. It is worth noting this critical elasticity probably lies well above the demand elasticity for some monopolistic services (such as water or electricity 11 ), but it is possibly lower than that for some goods subsectors, or particularly for goods suppliers where there is a single domestic supplier competing with a foreign competitive fringe.
12 It is therefore quite con-ceivable that national champions in many industries may be protected for pro…t-shifting reasons. Now consider the impact of allowing to alter, representing a rise in foreign share ownership. Simulations indicate the following relationship:
Foreign share Critical elasticity " 0% 2.7 5% 3.0 10% 3.6 15% 4.4 20% 5.9 25% 9.1 30% 20.0 Table 7 : Relationship between foreign share and critical elasticity for protecting a domestic monopoly.
The pattern shown in Table 7 indicates that, at low share ownership levels, the marginal e¤ect of raising foreign share ownership on the critical elasticity is not great: however, it becomes increasingly important, and once foreign share ownership rises above 20% the curve becomes steep. In other words, at the kind of foreign share-ownership level seen in most European countries today, the pro…t-shifting case for protection of a domestic monopolist breaks down quite rapidly.
6 Further considerations 6.1 FDI and international share ownership DICK (1993) based his estimates of the e¤ects of international ownership on US Department of Commerce estimates for 1986 of the stock of foreign direct investment in the USA. By contrast, most of the analysis in the …rst part of my paper is based upon estimates of foreign ownership of the stock markets of various countries. Both types of foreign investment are of relevant to the pro…t-shifting debate, but in di¤erent ways. FDI, in the form of complete ownership by foreigners of a local subsidiary, is the more visible form of foreign share ownership, yet the debate over 'national champions'generally focuses on …rms which appear, at …rst sight, not to be foreign-owned (or at least not primarily foreign-owned). The international share-ownership producers of between 5 and 10.
statistics from FESE indicate that, even when a …rm is not explicitly foreignowned, a high proportion of its pro…ts may still, in fact, end up in the hands of foreigners.
A recent mimeo paper by ISHIKAWA et al [2007] examines the interesting circumstances of partial FDI -in other words, the situation where a signi…cant proportion of its shares is owned by a foreign rival, even if the company is still quoted on the local stock exchange. This is undoubtedly an explanation of some cross-border share ownership (though not all), and does introduce interesting issues of mixed motivations for the subsidiary company.
13 This situation is somewhat more complex than those analysed in this paper.
Two-way share ownership
A further complication is that, not only do foreigners own a signi…cant proportion, ; of shares in country 1, but residents in country 1 may own a proportion of shares in the rival …rm based in country 2. While this is undoubtedly a possibility, it is most relevant in the two-country case examined in LEE's [1990] paper on cross-ownership. In most cases, at least where we are looking at individual European countries, the value of is likely to be much smaller than that of , due to the presence of many third-party countries. However, one quali…cation to this comes when we are looking at protectionism taken at the level of regional groupings or very large nations (say, the EU versus the United States), in which case may no longer be small. For this reason, in Appendix 2, I rework a number of the equations in the previous sections, taking account of two-directional ownership. In general, if a proportion of the foreign …rm is owned by country 1 residents, then the protectionist motive is weakened further.
To summarise:
In the linear, Cournot model of two …rms competing in a third market (section 3), there ceases to be a motive for export subsidies when
This presumably corresponds to one of the lines shown graphically in LEE's [1990] …gure 2. This reduces to = (1=4) when = 0:
In the linear, Cournot model of using a tari¤ to protect a domestic …rm against a rival (section 4.1), and con…ning ourself to the case with symmetric costs, the welfare-maximising import tari¤ is given by (16) t =(A C) = (3 2 )=(9 + 2 + 4 ):
For the regulatory protection setup in 4.1.2, the linear Cournot model gives us a critical threshold (17) 10 + 8 = 3:
At levels of international ownership exceeding this, assuming tari¤s are ruled out, country A will prefer to use regulatory protection or total exclusion of the foreign …rm, while at lower levels, it will not resort to regulatory protection. Again, if = 0; this reduces to = 0:3:
7 Summary and Conclusions BRANDER AND SPENCER [1985] established the idea that pro…t-shifting in oligopolistic industries could be a major motivation for protection. This was at a time when the great bulk of shares in any major country's …rms were usually held by domestic nationals. This situation has been steadily changing in the subsequent years, as national champion …rms have been privatised and as …nancial markets have become globalised. Analysis of the case of the United States around 1989 by DICK [1993] suggested that the optimal subsidy for an American-based exporting …rm in a linear Cournot duopoly setup was roughly half what the original BRANDER-SPENCER [1985] analysis suggested. In this paper, I suggest that the current e¤ect of international share ownership, at least in European economies, for which good data are available, is far greater even than Dick suggested. Analysis of European data suggests that typical share-ownership by foreigners is now over a third in many countries, and this could well be a signi…cant underestimate. Even when account is taken of corporate taxation, the share of pro…ts accruing to foreigners is 20-30 per cent in most countries on the lower estimate, while, on a higher estimate, taking account of indirect share ownership, it may well be over half in many cases. In a classic duopoly setup for a third country market, this would be enough to invalidate pro…t-shift on its own as a motive for export subsidy, both in a linear Cournot duopoly and (more marginally) in a duopoly with isoelastic demand, where optimal subsidies become negative when foreign ownership exceeds 1=3 (against 1=4 in the linear case).
As a consequence of this, I look at a somewhat wider class of duopoly scenarios, to gain an idea of the likely point, in practice, at which the subsidising or protectionist motive will break down, as foreign share ownership rises. For example, the use of pure horizontal regulatory protection (MASKUS AND WILSON, eds [2001] ) to keep out a competitor to a national champion on pro…t-shifting grounds is invalidated in a linear Cournot duopoly model when foreign ownership of the domestic …rm reaches 30%. With a Cournot model with isoelastic demand, based on common estimates of demand elasticities, the critical threshold share is likely to be somewhat lower.
A consequence, at least as far as individual European countries is concerned, is that pro…t-shifting on its own is no longer likely to provide an economic justi…cation for 'economic patriotism'. This does not mean there is no pro…t-shifting, 14 but pro…t-shifting will only justify protection at the margin when combined with other factors, such as scale economies or general equilibrium terms-of-trade arguments. An example of this is the setting of welfare-maximising tari¤s on a foreign competitor to a local …rm (section 4.1.1 ). In this case, there is an additional motive for protection: revenueraising. In a linear Cournot duopoly, an increase in foreign ownership of the domestic …rm would reduce the tari¤ from 33:33% of the di¤erence between at zero foreign ownership to 25% with 30 per cent foreign ownership and 20% with half the shares owned by foreigners 15 . This is the only scenario, of those examined here, where European countries would still have a justi…cation for protection -yet, even here, rising international share ownership means that, year-on-year, pro…t-shifting is getting less important.
One caveat to this is that economic decisions are increasingly being taken at the level of regional blocs, such as the European Union. Since some shares within EU countries are held by residents of other EU countries, the level of non-EU ownership of EU shares will be less than that of all foreigners in the market of an individual EU country, so weakening the international ownership e¤ect. Against this, EU residents will own a signi…cant proportion of shares in many non-EU countries.
A second caveat is that governments'or electorates'perceptions may not yet have caught up with the developments in …rm ownership. Consequently, it is quite possible that protectionist policies and 'economic patriotism'may survive for some time yet, even when they make no economic sense for the countries concerned.
(source FESE*) Foreign % of total Foreign % of foreign+indiv+public Table 3 : E¤ective average corporate taxation and lower and higher estimates of the share of pro…ts accruing abroad.
Appendix 2: Cross-ownership of shares
In the main paper, I assume simply that proportion of shares in the home …rm is owned by foreigners. However, a proportion of shares in the foreign competitor will be owned by inhabitants of the home country. Normally, we would assume < , and may well be close to zero. However, in the case of large nations or economic groupings, such as the United States or the European Union, may be large enough to be signi…cant. In this Appendix, I look at the e¤ects on some of the games outlined in the main paper of allowing to be non-zero. This produces a critical threshold for values of f ; g.
Taxation of a foreign competitor.
I look at the symmetric model only.
With tari¤ t and regulatory barrier Firm 1 pro…ts 1 = (A C + t + ) 2 =9b: Firm 2 pro…ts 2 = (A C 2t 2 )(A C + t + )=9b: Consumer surplus V = (2A 2C t ) 2 =18b: Tari¤ revenue T = t(A C 2t 2 )=3b: Welfare country 1 W (A C)(3 2 ) = t (9 + 2 + 4 ); t =(A C) = (3 2 )=(9 + 2 + 4 ):
9.2 Total exclusion of a foreign competitor to a national champion.
Monopoly Duopoly Pro…t …rm 1 1M = (A C) 2 =4b 1D = (A C) 2 =9b: Pro…t …rm 2 2D = (A C) 2 =9b: Consumer surplus V M = (A C) 2 =8b V D = 2(A C) 2 =9b: Welfare W 1M = (3 2 )(A C) 2 =8b W 1D = (3 + )(A C) 2 =9b: Country 1 is indi¤erent between letting in or excluding the foreign …rm if W 1D = W 1jM : (3 + )(A C) 2 =9b = (3 2 )(A C) 2 =8b; 8(3 + ) = 9(3 2 ); 10 + 8 = 3:
